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I. CONTROL OVER SOCIAL CHANGE
THROUGH ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT
It seems a plausible assumption that man has always, to
a greater or lesser degree, undertaken to grasp and maintain
some control over his environment through anticipatory assess-
ments of proposed actions. Two basic questions are involved:
1) What changes in the social environment will be brought
about by the contemplated action which would not otherwise
occur? and 2) What will be the social significance of such
changes?
While the effort to impose some measure of control over
the direction and rate of social change has a long history,
the prospective evaluative function has come to unusual promi-
nence in the past decade in large measure as a result of the
perception of incompatibility between uncritical expansion of
industrial-consumption practices and the new urgency for access
to and enjoyment of a much broader spectrum of social values.
The resulting need for more careful allocation and applica-
tion of available resources to pressing, and competing, social
needs is evident. This being so, we are understandably becom-
ing more concerned with the inability of influential decision-
making entities to identify and evaluate the full range of
consequences which will or may flow from new public or public/
private initiatives - technological or otherwise.
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Anticipatory Project Assessment, whether expressed as
policy analysis, social impact evaluation, or technology
assessment, can be characterized as the capacity to perform,
and the disposition to take into account in relevant decisional
arenas, the following operations:
. Identification of the significant effects (necessary
or inevitable, probable, or possible) which will
result from the introduction of a specified project
configuration into alternative projected future social
environments during the planning, implementation a.nd
operational stages.
. Evaluation of such Effects in terms of Social Impacts
on affected participants and social value-institutional
processes in accord with speckled concepts/standards
of Social Justice, i.e., schemes of social value weight
and distribution.
Presumably, from the perspective of the accountable, public
sector decision maker, this evaluative function will contribute
an appreciable increment of control over the direction and rate
of social change by: 1) facilitating judgments as to when or
when not to take particular innovative actions; 2) providing
insights into the advisability of taking major, all-out efforts
as contrasted with incremental response to changing conditions;
and by 3) suggesting the more preferable project configurations
(alternative means) to apply to the achievement of objectives
consistent with intended (or acceptable) concepts of Social
Justice.
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II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969:
A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE
ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA 1969)
provides a useful framework for evaluating the prospective
development of the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function in
that the conditions and trends previously noted will have con-
siderable effect on its implementation. This Act would seem
to have substantial utility as an instrument for moderating the
direction and rate of technological innovation as a component
of social change. It also has considerable potential for
advancing the public policy analytical capability of the
nation. First, however, we should consider the possibility
that the §102(2)(C) "environmental impact statement" require-
ment for all major Federal actions could be a delusion to the
extent it becomes form rather than substance. But assuming
that this requirement can be a tremendously potent instrument
for anticipatory project assessment, one must look closely at
the prospects for the development of this potential. Environ-
mental impact statements have been required since January 1,
19.70, it is to be noted, but without benefit of the organiza-
tional resources and conceptual and analytical skills which
NEPA explicitly recognizes to be necessary. §102(2) (A) directs
agencies to:
utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning
and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's
environment;
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and §102(2)(B) directs that agencies develop methods, procedures,
and techniques
. . . which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
priate consideration in decision-making along with
economic and technical considerations; . . .
The establishment of an assessment requirement by NEPA
has some initial value as a means of focusing attention on
the assessment function and in creating a "market" for a needed
capability as well as project evaluation outcomes. However,
it remains a fair and critical question as to how we can
reasonably expect adequate anticipatory assessment outcomes
in form of §102(2)(C) statements when the resources made
available for developing the requisite analytical capability
remain at a precariously low level. Perhaps only catastrophes,
persistent court actions to implement legislation requiring
impact statements, and angry citizen protests of particular
projects (with resulting delay and increased costs) will
eventually stimulate the necessary support for an adequate
anticipatory project assessment function.
For present purposes, however, let us assume that resources
will be made available for APA and examine some of the questions
which will arise in the analytical operations of an assessment
function. Attention will be directed to the implications of
§102(2)(B) since this subsection refers to the analytical com-
ponent of the assessment process. The injunction that Federal
agencies develop techniques which will "insure that presently
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unquantified environmental amenities and values ... be given
appropriate consideration," presumably in a rational process
of decision, obviously obscures and ignores a great deal more
than it illuminates. For example, §102(2)(B) refers to
"environmental amenities and values" which must mean that certain
"values" should be given explicit recognition and some measurable
degree of social significance in the public decision process. If
so, then §102(2)(B) refers to only the final step in a rather
intricate methodology of anticipatory assessment. §102(2)(B)
suggests no distinction between the effects (changes or
consequences) which might flow from the introduction of a
technological application into a future social environment,
the widely varying types of effects, the participants and
social interests which might be affected by each change, and
the social impact to be attached to each of these changes
on participants and value-institutional processes. Further,
the task of giving some measurable or operational significance
«
to affected social interests will vary with the characteristics
of the Decisional Context.
Put otherwise, §102(2)(B) is without discrimination as to
Decisional Context, stating only that techniques be developed so
that "presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision making."
(Italics supplied) The same effect, as for example noise from
transportation systems, will clearly differ with the decisional
situation. Noise can be measured or quantified in physical
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terms on a decibel scale and by various facilitating constructs
such as NEF and CNEL. Further measurable dimensions can be
given to noise effects by such means as determining the number
of people residing within a given NEF contour. While this is
a means of measuring the magnitude of the noise effect it is
not an evaluation of the social significance of the noise or
conversely, the degree of social interest in noise abatement.
The social significance will depend upon a number of factors
such as competing social interests involved in the particular
decision context. One might plausibly take the position that
no social value can be "quantified" in terms of operational
social significance without relating it to a specific decisional
situation.
Presumably, the underlying rationale of §102(2)(B) is that
by giving some measurable dimensions to environmental values
and amenities an ultimate decision on a proposed "major Federal
action" can be based on an approximate social benefit/cost
assessment. Some court cases have construed the purpose of
§102(2) (C) statements as support for such decisions although
the NEPA is basically a "full disclosure law" rather than a
decision making mechanism. As was stated by the D.C. Circuit
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC;
The sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling
consideration of any and all types of environmental
impact of federal action.
However,"in the"same opinion the court stated that --
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment
on the part of federal agencies. In each individual
case, the particular economic and technical benefits
of planned action must be assessed and then weighed
against the environmental costs; alternatives must
be considered which would affect the balance of
values.
and in Environmental Defense Fund/ Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
the court asserted that it was the intent of the Congress
through NEPA to require the agencies of the Federal government
to objectively evaluate all of their projects,
regardless of how much money has already been
spent thereon and regardless of the degree of
completion of work. (Emphasis added).
The language of certain court opinions would indicate
that the Congressional intent with respect to NEPA was to
assure a total social impact assessment of particular projects.
However, it is also clear that the courts consider the politi-
cal branches of government to be the final decision makers.
The opinions also tend to recognize that elements of "judgment"
must be left with the ultimate political decision makers.
As noted in the EDF v. Corps of Engineers, the Court stated
that:
The methods of calculating cost-benefit ratios
are innumerable and in many cases esoteric. The
Court's judgment as to sound procedures in this
regard might well not be in accord with the
judgment of Congress.
Secretary of HEW Elliot L. Richardson has stated in this
connection, we do need to "be able to measure the cost of
each alternative (but) our skills in this area are seriously
underdeveloped." He continues:
The hard choices, in the end, are bound to depend on
some combination of values and instincts - and, indeed,
. it is precisely because the content of choice cannot be
reduced to a mathematical equation that we need the
political forum to reach the final, most difficult
decisions.
To recognize this, however, reinforces the importance
of being honest and explicit as possible in articulating
the non-measurable considerations that transcend the
limits of objective analysis.
If we accept the Richardson proposition that we need im-
proved social cost/benefit analysis in order better to clarify
policy options for decision makers but that there are limits
to the analytical approach, then certain questions arise. For
example, what conditions, including analytical disabilities,
impose such limits? Is it the unavoidable uncertainty associ-
ated with the projection of future social environments? Is it
a lack of ability to identify the effects (consequences or
changes) which will result from the introduction of a proposed
project into a future social environment? Is it a lack of
ability to measure the probability and magnitude of such effects
if identified? Is it due to a lack of ability to determine the
interaction of effects (does a given effect reinforce or reduce
other effects in the decisional context)? Is it a lack of
conceptual ability to determine when effects must be aggregated
or isolated and fragmented in order to render them "operational"
for purposes of evaluating their social impacts? Is it a lack
of consensus on social values or on priority social needs which
precludes accord in the calculation of the social impacts of
the effects of the proposed action?
The foregoing questions suggest deficiencies in future-
oriented conceptual thinking and in analytical skills but are
hardly satisfactory operational criteria for determining the
"limits of analysis" with respect to any given problem assess-
ment. It is likely as indicated throughout this paper that
the "limits of analysis" will differ with each specific decisional
context when measured, for example, by the extent to which
"demonstrable data" can be effectively applied to the identifi-
cation of effects of proposed projects and to approximation
of their probability and magnitude or to the establishment
of the conditions under which and the parameters within which
realistic discretion can be exercised (or differing social
value positions registered) in the establishment of normative
standards. Or the question might be one of determining what
effort and expense is justified in acquiring additional
"demonstrable data" for a specific assessment. Will the incre-
mental contribution such data will make to a rational process
of decision justify its cost? For instance, will it reduce
elements of uncertainty? When data and analysis can no longer
contribute to the reduction of uncertainty as to effect
identification and measurement or to the social impact evalua-
tion of such effects or otherwise to the clarification of
optional choices, then the assessing entity must resort to
other less objective techniques and procedures, including
various forms of adversarial system.
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III. RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE CONCEPTS
FOR SOCIAL IMPACT EVALUATION OF EFFECTS
Why must the assessor be concerned with notions of social
justice? The sufficient reason is that whether effects of a
given action (and their distribution) are considered social
benefits or social costs and to what extent will depend upon,
in varying degree, the social value perspective (notion(s)
of social justice) of the participant evaluating the action
outcome. By expressing, simplistically, the social impact of
an identified effect as the product of the probability of the
occurrence of the effect (resulting change, consequence), the
magnitude of the effect (by relevant dimensions of measure-
ment) , and the degree of social desirability (or undesirability)
of the effect, then it is evident that techniques for giving
some measurable dimension to social desirability must be
applied in the process of anticipatory project assessment.
Alternative concepts of social justice reflect different
preferences as to social value weight and distribution. Hence,
the degree of social desirability attached to the social value
(or values) associated with a given effect will differ with
the social justice concepts invoked by affected participants.
It is recognized that the social value orientations of most
participants may be only partially explicit and by no means
constitute a comprehensive rationale of political system.
Other aspects of the relationship of.social .justice concepts
to anticipatory project assessment should be recognized in
- 11 -
addition to the fact that participants will make divergent
evaluations of the effects of actions and projects reflecting
their differing social value perspectives. In our pluralistic
society there are numerous generally accepted notions of
social justice including those prescribed in the Constitutional
structure and otherwise formally sanctioned. The relevance
or applicability of such concepts will vary somewhat with the
institutional arena (courts, legislature, regulatory agency,
executive, etc.) and the precise decisional context (including
the arena, the issue or proposed action, the participants,
the social values involved, and the alternatives open to the
decisional entity). Further, what constitutes compliance
with a specified social justice concept (which may have general
relevance in various decisional arenas) will also vary with the
precise context.
In a public decision process with a strong adversarial
component various participants will advance different concepts
or standards of social justice, often expressed narrowly and
explicitly in terms of specific social interests which support
a'preferred decisional outcome. Further, anticipatory project
assessments made by the diverse participants in the public
decision process with respect to a given project may range from
the most exclusive (and narrowly focused, often for purely
partisan purposes) to the most inclusive (undertaken from an
impartial perspective and designed to include consideration of
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all affected participants and value-institutional processes).
The essential point is that inclusive total social impact
assessments of given projects inevitably require explicit-
ness in selecting and identifying the social justice concept
or standard (or combination thereof) by which the social
costs and benefits of the assessment outcome are to be measured -
if the assessment is to include social impact evaluation in
addition to mere effect identification. It would not seem
inaccurate to state that this aspect of assessment methodology
has received scant systematic attention to date.
This is not presumed to be a simple task as the frustrations
of the National Academy of Engineering's Committee on Tele-
communications amply illustrate in the Committee's effort to
define the public interest with respect to electromagnetic-
spectrum management. The Report states in part:
The ideal system/ as defined for this search, would be
a systematic procedure that could be applied to deter-
mine and assess the social and economic values associ-
ated with the spectrum management decisions. The
answers obtained by such a system should be independent
of those carrying out the procedures. The decisions
indicated should be in the public interest and should
contribute to the general welfare. Our search found
no such system. It was concluded that some type of
formula employing numerical values represented the
only hope, but the study led to the conclusion that such
an ideal system does not exist nor can it be formulated.
The most basic reason for the failure of a formula
approach is mathematical. A function cannot be simul-
taneously maximized for several dependent variables.
The greatest good for the greatest number of people,
or the greatest value for the least cost, simply does
not exist.
This statement of exasperation is understandable under the
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circumstances but does little to further the development of
an adequate policy evaluative function. The Committee did
consider that its work was "to a degree. . . a subcategory
of technology assessment" and found its experience "well
expressed" by the following paragraph of the National Academy
of Sciences Report on Technology; Processes of Assessment
and Choice;
As in any problem calling for evaluation of a proposed
resource allocation or distribution, the assessment of
a contemplated technological development raises vexing
issues of welfare economics, political theory, and
ethics. Economists, philosophers, and lawyers have
debated these matters among themselves and with one
another for generations. Surely it would be unrealistic
to suppose that this report could somehow resolve them.
Nevertheless, this analytical challenge cannot be escaped. It
is crucial to the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function.
The Purpose of anticipatory assessment is to clarify policy
and project options in terms of their social implications in
order that intelligent choices can be made by responsible
political decision makers.
Yet, it is apparent that while such fundamental concepts
of social justice as promotion of the "general welfare" or
"equal protection of the laws" or "fairness" or provision for
"maximization of individual autonomy consistent with similar
exercise by all" may be prescribed as the guiding social pur-
pose of particular actions or projects, such standards are not
usually operationally adequate means of measuring and evaluating
the actual outcomes of such projects. The translation of the
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more general social justice concepts into explicit social
value or social interest schemes will often facilitate the
assessment task. Social interest schemes can be useful in
suggesting possible consequences of a given action and hence,
can contribute to effects identification. Such schemes can
also be designed so as to reflect the social value emphasis of
alternative concepts of social justice and thereby provide a
means of evaluating the social impacts of the consequences of
an action.
Nevertheless, should there be any lingering doubts con-
cerning the relevance of social justice concepts to the task
of total social impact assessment, reference can be made to
selected existing problem areas and emerging policy decisions
having clear social justice implications. Any situation in-
volving the allocation of scarce resources raises social
justice questions as, for example, selection of criteria for
regulating access to the currently inadequate supply of arti-
ficial kidney (dialysis) machines, and, more generally, the
selection of criteria for allocating "scarce medical care."
Apportionment of costs for a given public need raises similar
questions. A great variety of situations involving the
"safety" factor, frequently placed in a "risk/benefit" frame-
work, directly involve questions of what participants should
be protected to what extent and at what cost to whom? The
social justice implications of safety measures have been
explicitly treated by the National Transportation Safety
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Board. The numerous inquiries now being raised with respect
to medical ethics and the patient in extremis, as well as
inquiries into the implications of genetic engineering,
require evaluations which are either explicitly or implicitly
based upon some notions (if not systematic schemes) of
social justice, and consequently, of what are social bene-
fits, what are social costs, and how they should be distri-
buted* Both the relevance and complexities of social jus-
tice considerations are vividly projected by the current
efforts to find rational modes of establishing the "value
of human life" for application in public policy planning
decisions.
Every proposed action or project clearly has social
justice implications, since by whatever concept of social
justice applied, there will be benefits, there will be costs,
and such benefits and costs will be distributed among various
groups in society. Those who bear the costs of a given
action are frequently not the direct or primary beneficiaries.
It is also of the utmost importance to note that alternative
means of achieving a specified objective may have quite differ-
ent consequences for affected participants or even involve
radically different groups of participants. The total social
impact would thus vary with the means used to reach the
specified objective. This being so, notions of social justice
may strongly influence the alternative means selected.
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Perhaps in most situations of anticipatory project assess-
ment some guidance will be given the assessment entity as to
the social justice concept (project objectives or criteria) to
be applied to social impact evaluation. For example, statutory
authority of Federal agencies will provide Statements of Policy
as to what is sought to be achieved by projects performed
pursuant to such authority. Frequently these policy directives
are broad, ambiguous, and may'encompass conflicting - if not
downright contradictory - policy objectives. However, regu-
lations of agencies and the decisions in the various arenas
of legal process may provide a fairly satisfactory scheme of
social objectives which can be employed by the assessing entity
as social impact evaluative criteria. More specifically,
•
Agency guidelines for the submission of Environmental Impact
Statements pursuant to NEPA 1969 §102(2)(C) and Agency Requests
for Proposals are sources of evaluative criteria.
Occasionally, inclusive, impartial assessment entities may
be requested - or undertake on their own initiative - to
make an anticipatory assessment of a proposed or potential
project without guidance or limitations on criteria to be
employed for social impact evaluation. It is then up to the
assessing entity to develop or select and posit criteria.
Such criteria would most likely reflect the "controlling"
norms of the Constitutional framework, ..cultural traditions,
and social practices, though the assessing entity may not
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feel obliged to adhere strictly to these constraints. What
is required is that the social justice concept employed be
made explicit.
The notion of social justice has been introduced to
demonstrate the relevance of social value perspective to the
analytical operations of anticipatory project assessment,
that is, that the evaluation of effects for social signifi-
cance depends upon the social justice concept adopted for the
assessment. While the public decision process in operation
is frequently little more than a contest between contending
parties asserting narrow, strictly partisan interests, it is
•
certainly obligatory upon our authoritative decisional entities
(courts, legislatures, regulatory agencies, administrators, etc.)
to apply recognized and acceptable notions of social justice.
In any event, this analysis, unless otherwise noted, will pro-
ceed from the perspective of such authoritative entities,
presumably undertaking to arrive at acceptable public interest
outcomes. Further, the assessment function will be viewed
from the perspective of an inclusive-oriented entity, com-
mitted to providing the authoritative decisional entities
with outcomes which will assist such entities to arrive at
determinations consistent with specified social justice
concepts. Hence, assessment entities, from this perspec-
tive, are obligated to produce outcomes in accord with ex-
plicit concepts of social justice (whether posited by the
entity or otherwise prescribed). Through this approach,
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assessment outcomes have meaning for all affected partici-
pants. The outcome would not be represented as the pre-
ferred course of action by the assessing entity. Its function
in the public decision process is to establish an analytical
standard by which other alternatives can be evaluated by
affected participants in the relevant decisional context.
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IV. SOCIAL IMPACT EVALUATION IN LEGAL PROCESS
We have innumerable value-institutional processes in
society which are regularly employed to express individual,
group, and social preferences in the private sector, including
the market system, as well as institutionalized processes for
public decisions involving formal prescriptions. §102(2)(B)
apparently envisages the development and application of
analytically repeatable procedures which can provide useful
"measures" of "environmental amenities and values." More
broadly, however, it must be the essential import of various
"social systems" analytical approaches such as technology
assessment (as well as the assumptions underlying the NEPA
of 1969 and other recent legislation requiring some form of
anticipatory project assessment) that we possess the capacity
to plan, implement, operate, monitor, and modify public
projects so as to optimize preferred social justice outcomes.
If so, then the analytical operations involved in anticipa-
tory project assessment can be most usefully discussed with
respect to the utilization of assessment outcomes in the more
influential decisional arenas. It is in such decisional con-
texts that the "demonstrable data" (used broadly to include
scientific, technological, economic, social behavioral models,
analytical approaches, etc.) will be offered in support of
effect identification and measurement and social impact
evaluation of such effects. It is in these arenas that
- 20 -
strenuous efforts will be made, arising from a variety of
motivations, to distinguish between "factual certainty" and
speculation. The adversarial system will inevitably come
into play in this process of evaluating the assessment out-
come. Further, the adversarial system has a legitimate role
in decisional situations where uncertainty as to facts exists
especially with respect to "projected facts" (future social
environments, resulting changes when the project is intro-
duced, etc.) and whenever there exist differences among
affected participants as to what social interests are affected
and the extent. It is to be expected that conflicting posi-
tions will be expressed with respect to the social interests
at stake, the extent to which such interests are advanced
or deprived, and that preferred distributions of costs and
benefits will be justified or rationalized on the basis of
one or more concepts of social justice.
The legal system in its various arenas - judicial, legis-
lative, regulatory, administrative - has always been involved
in anticipatory project assessment. However, the analysis of
projects in these arenas has for the most part been truncated
and unsystematic, failing to take into account all participants
and value-institutional processes likely to be affected by a
proposed project. This deficiency has contributed to an im-
balance in the protection of the full range of social interests
as is evident" from the environmental pollution-problems with ---
which we are now confronted. This situation has also led to
- 21 -
*
the interest in and demand for more systematic anticipatory
project assessment.
It is probably accurate to state that our formal decisional
entities have not always made the best use of available "demon-
strable data" in support of their decisions. This could have
reduced the element of uncertainty and, consequently, uninformed
advocacy. Surely, more effective use can be made of
"scientifically-based" data and analysis for the purpose of
establishing the parameters within which attainable social
objectives might be sought, i.e. , what social objectives
can be achieved through what means within what period of
time at what cost. Factual appraisals of conditions and
trends may not in themselves define social goals but relevant
contextual'conditions do control, within limits, what is
feasible in what time at what cost.
However, the legal system should not be unduly faulted.
Decisions must be made. Furthermore, many techniques for
performing analytical operations similar to those required
for anticipatory assessment have been developed. These con-
cepts and procedures can be studied with profit by those
undertaking anticipatory project assessments. For example,
the judiciary, while normally dealing with the reactive
effects of existing projects rather than with the assessment
of proposed projects, has employed several modes of social
impact evaluation.
Much of judicial precedent is a history of the reduction
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of "unquantified. . .amenities and values" to measurable,
operational, and understandable terms through techniques of
comparing the social significance of competing interests or
by awarding damages to compensate for harm (value deprivation).
The notion of "standing to sue" and the requirement for a
"case or controversy" in our Constitutional system reflect
a concern for limiting judicial cognizance of claims to
litigants who can be clearly associated with a "stake" in the
alleged dispute, i.e. , an ascertainable social benefit or
deprivation related to the issue. However, the courts have
also recognized the difficulty of making social value deter-
minations as is illustrated by the doctrine of "consideration"
in contracts. The courts do not look to the "adequacy" of the
consideration or the comparative value ( from a "market"
standpoint) of what is given or promised by one party in ex-
change for a promise by the other party. Within slight
limitations, the courts leave it to the parties to determine
what is a "fair" or "satisfactory" bargain from their respec-
tive standpoints.
Fairly common instances of evaluation by courts of both
the social impacts of specific effects and the social signifi-
cance of competing effects and their associated social interests
include nuisance actions (the interference with the use and
enjoyment of property), suits for invasion of privacy, dis-
ability determinations, and actions involving the "value of
human life" under "wrongful death" and "survival" statutes.
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Some facets of the latter actions may be reduced to monetary
measures such as funeral expenses and the approximate loss of
future earnings during the normal life expectancy of one in
position of the deceased. Such elements of damages as "pain
and suffering" and the "grief" and "emotional distress" of
the survivors are not easily amenable to the computational
approach. However, judgments in numerous cases include dam-
ages for "loss of consortium" and some courts have awarded
damages for "loss of enjoyment of life" where an injured
person was no longer capable of pursuing activities of special
interest. It is iterated time and time again in decisional
contexts involving the above types of effects and claims for
compensation that whether the claim is cognizable at all in
legal process and if so, to what extent in terms of damages,
depends upon the circumstances.
While the social impacts of certain effects have some-
times been susceptible of objective, monetary measurement
through "calculations," as noted above, other modes of arriv-
ing at damages are utilized such as by the use of expert witnesses
or by leaving the award to a process of community judgment (as
by a jury). In some contexts, precision in social impact
evaluation is not necessary in coming to a judgment. In the
case of Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., an action in
damages for the death of an aviator whose airplane struck trans-
mission wires erected by the defendant company over the Susque-
hanna River, the court commented that the transmission line
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was a dangerous instrumentality and that the care to be
exercised in a particular case must always be proportionate
to the seriousness of the consequences which are reasonably
to be anticipated as a result of the conduct in question.
The defendant Company stated in its brief that: "The social
value of the electrical industry's contribution to the public
interest is beyond computation or description even though
it may exact a certain toll of human life as its price." The
court stated: "Accepting this statement as a basis for reflec-
tion, there is no reason, where preventable, that there should
be any toll of human life." The court quoted from another
Pennsylvania case to the effect that: "When human life is at
stake, the rule of due care and diligence requires everything
that gives reasonable promise of its preservation to be done,
regardless of difficulties or expense," and concluded:
In comparison to the benefits of saving a human life,
the cost of a few cans of paint and a few electric
bulbs would be negligible. And since the defendant
company is engaged in the very manufacture of creation
of electric current, the cost of the current needed
to supply the illumination would be as insignificant
as the cost of a few bread crumbs in a bakery.
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V. DEPENDENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT EVALUATION
ON THE SPECIFIC DECISIONAL CONTEXT
A. Relevance of Decisional Context Approach to APA
Great stress has been placed herein on the notion of
decisional context for the purpose of demonstrating that:
. Any given, identifiable Effect (consequence or change)
which may result from an existing activity or is a
possible consequence of a proposed project or other
action is likely to differ to some extent with respect
to its probability and magnitude (in whatever dimen-
sions which may be appropriate for measurement) in each
specific decisional context.
. The degree of Social Desirability or Undesirability of
such Effect (independent of the probability or magni-
tude of such effect in particular situations) will de-
pend upon the concept or standard of social justice
(scheme of social value weights and distribution)
applied by the decisional entity (which may or may not
be consistent with the notion or notions of social
justice advanced by one or more of the affected parti-
cipants contending in the particular decisional situa-
tion) and the concepts applied are likely to differ
somewhat from one decisional context to another.
. The Social Impact (product of the probability X magni-
tude X social desirability) of the Effect will there-
fore likely differ in each specific decisional context.
. Even if the Social Impact of such Effect remains con-
stant in various specific decisional contexts, the
Social Significance (relative importance) of the Social
Impact of such Effect is, nevertheless, subject to
(perhaps likely to) shift with each specific decisional
context for reason that the combination of Effects (and
their associated beneficial and/or detrimental social
impacts) to be "balanced" or "traded-off" will differ
to some extent in each decisional context.
The discussion of social impact evaluation of effects to
this point has focused primarily on judicial arena contexts.
But clearly, the mode of determining the social impact and
social significance of effects will differ somewhat among the
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decisional arenas: judicial, legislative, regulatory, execu-
tive-administrative, etc. Courts are normally, though not
always, concerned with existing controversies while legisla-
tures, and frequently regulatory commissions, are concerned
with evaluation of the social impacts and social significance
of the effects of proposed actions or programs.
The institutional restraint on the judiciary's indisposi-
tion as well as incapacity (perhaps both analytical and
jurisdictional) to perform total social impact assessments can
be seen in the case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., wherein
the court refused to consider the full public harm resulting
from dirt, smoke, and vibration emanating from the cement
plant, limiting the plaintiff's remedy to damages. The Court
stated:
The nuisance complained of by the plaintiffs may have
other public or private consequences, but these par-
ticular parties are the only ones who have sought
remedies and the judgment proposed will fully redress
them.
The Court observed that questions of "broad public objectives"
must be left to the executive and legislative branches,
apparently and perhaps justifiably assuming that pollution is
a public problem with which the judiciary can deal only in a
fragmentary, ad hoc way as suits are brought by private parties,
But even in decisional arenas and contexts in which total
social impact evaluations of a given action must be made,
constraints exist on the ability of such arenas to-perform
social cost/benefit analyses. This point has been put by
- 27 -
Secretary of HEW, Elliot L. Richardson, in "Choice: A Cruel
Necessity" as follows:
There are, of course, severe limits on the practical
use of evaluation and cost-benefit analysis. Such
techniques may help us to choose the best way to use
an additional $1 million on homemaker services for the
elderly or preschool education for disadvantaged
children. They may even offer some basis for compar-
ing the social return on one or another such investment.
But a choice between homemaker services and preschool
education cannot and should not rest only on this
kind of analysis. Even though it could be shown that
the investment in preschool education paid larger
dividends for a longer future, our feelings toward
the generation to which we owe our own existence and
education cannot be fed into this kind of calculation.
The hard choices, in the end, are bound to depend on
some combination of values and instincts--and, indeed,
it is precisely because the content of choice cannot
be reduced to a mathematical equation that we need
the political forum to reach the final, most difficult
decisions.
To recognize this, however, reinforces the importance of
being as honest and explicit as possible in articulating
the non-measurable considerations that transcend the
limits of objective analysis. Only if these considera-
tions are exposed to full view can we bring those whose
expectations have to be deferred—or overruled—to
accept the legitimacy of the process by which this
was done. Only thus can we hope to reconcile the
loser to losing and encourage the impatient to wait.
With respect to the mandate of §102(2)(B) of the NEPA of
1969, that techniques be developed for the rational considera-
tion of "presently unquantified environmental values and
amenities" in the public decision process, the import of the
decisional context approach is that while empirical data and
analytical techniques can contribute to this task, such
evaluations are also heavily dependent on the decisional arena,
the customary processes of decision in the particular arena, the
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alternative actions available to the deciding entity, and the
social values associated with the various alternatives.
Hence, the assertion that certain determinations are
thrown into the "political process" when, presumably, the
"limits of analysis" are reached does little to advance the
anticipatory assessment function. Rather, this indiscriminate
if not blatant mode of dismissing the usefulness of "demonstra-
tive data" obscures the vast diversity of the decisional con-
te,xts which arise in the continuing operations of the public
decision process and thus tends to inhibit efforts to examine
the informational and analytical resources which may be available,
depending upon such considerations as:
. The decisional arena and entity involved.
. The issue, problem, or analytical-assessment task
presented.
. The participants affected by impending or proposed
action.
. The alternative dispositions or courses of action
available to the decisional entity.
. The social interests associated with the effects which
would result from each alternative outcome.
. The techniques of inquiry available to clarify the
consequences of each available alternative and to
evaluate the social impacts of effects identified.
. The decisional processes customarily utilized or
permissible in the arena for selecting a preferred
alternative outcome.
While it is not ordinarily to be expected that a judicial
context will involve a total social impact assessment of an
existing or proposed project, it may nevertheless be persuasively
- 29 -
argued that every decisional action should consider {insofar as
its authority and capabilities permit) the full social implica-
tions of its decisional outcomes. This notion is, in fact,
the essential thrust of the assessment function. It also
assumes that a relatively high level of analytical capability
is available or can be developed to identify effects and to
evaluate the social impact of such effects. In other words,
such decisions are not to be abandoned to the turbulence
of the "political process" without at least the benefit of
clarification of the implications of alternative outcomes by
application of the most reliable analytical procedures available,
It would seem that the foregoing assumptions would underlie
the implementation of an approach to environmental pollution
such as that proposed in the 1971 Economic Report of the
President.
While it might be tempting to say that no one should
be allowed to do any polluting, such a ban would
require the cessation of virtually all economic
activity. Since society places a value both on
material goods and on clean air and water, arrangements
must be devised that permit the value we place on
each to determine our choices. Additional industrial
development, increased use of pesticides on farms,
and a growing volume of municipal sewage mean dirtier
water downstream and fewer opportunities for recrea-
tion. On the other hand, stricter rules for pollu-
tion control generally mean either higher taxes or
higher prices for goods. What we seek, therefore, is
a set of rules for use of the environment which
balances the advantages of each activity against its
costs in other activities foregone. We want to elimi-
nate pollution only when the physical and aesthetic
discomfort it creates and its damage to people and
things are more costly than the value of the good
things--the abundance of industrial or farm products
and efficient transportation—whose production has
caused the pollution.
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This statement strongly suggests that social benefit/
cost ratios are approximately determinable although it does
not deal with the techniques for making such measurements.
Further, it must be noted that in its plea that environmental
quality not be over-emphasized to the detriment of other
social interests, the statement hardly does more than hint
that the evaluation of "advantages" and "costs" may differ
considerably among affected participants, depending upon
their concept of social justice. Nevertheless, the statement
does convey the notion that the full implications of decisional
outcomes should be identified and evaluated in contrast to an
approach undertaking to eradicate a specific harm irrespective
of consequences for other social interests. It also suggests
the importance of context.
The significance of context and the need to look at the
full implications of a given action is treated in depth by
Professor R. H. Coase in his interesting article on "The
Problem of Social Cost." Coase addresses the question of
assessing social benefits and costs by emphasizing the diver-
gence of views on this matter. In a rather extended discussion
of the relevance of context to the analysis of social benefits
and costs, Coase stresses in his analysis of the advisability of
governmental intervention for handling the "problem of harmful
effects" that "where the boundary line should be drawn . . . has
to come from a detailed investigation of the~actual results
of handling the problem in different ways."
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The relevance of decision context to social impact
evaluation is vividly presented by the range and diversity
of environmental noise situations wherein relief from exist-
ing noise intrusion is sought or a conscious effort is made
to minimize noise intrusion in the future, whether from exist-
ing activities or proposed projects. Environmental noise
situations provide a useful device for illustrating the impli-
cations of the specific decisional approach to social impact
evaluation for reason that "noise" (unwanted or harmful sound)
has the following characteristics among others:
. Noise has innumerable sources - both stationary and
moving.
. Noise results in a broad range of physiological and
psychological effects - some of which are extremely
difficult to measure in terms of magnitude or of
social undesirability.
. Various alternative means are available, depending
upon the decisional situation, for the prevention of
or alleviation of detrimental sound effects: abate-
ment at the source, reduction of noise effects, and
compensation for harm resulting from noise.
Consequently, decisional contexts involving the prime objec-
tive of avoiding, reducing, or compensating for adverse noise
effects are extremely helpful in illustrating the principal
notions discussed herein:
. The range and diversity of decisional contexts.
. The alternative courses of action available to the
decisional entity based on the full characteristics
of the decisional context.
. The techniques which might be applicable in each
situation to determine the extent of the noise effect.
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. The concepts of social justice advanced indicating the
degree to which noise intrusion is a social harm (or
that quietude is a social benefit) either in demonstrable
terms or on a comparative basis with other societal
values
and indicating preferred abatement actions in terms of
the degree of benefit and of cost and the distribution
thereof.
. Evaluation of the social impacts of the noise intrusion
effect based on the extent of the noise intrusion in
the particular case and the concept of social justice
(or social value scheme) accepted by the decisional
entity.
. Modes of determining the relative social significance
of the social impact of the noise effect in the parti-
cular context wherein other interacting effects result
in impacts affecting other social interests.
. Summary of decisional approaches in legal-policy process
for measuring the social impact and relative social
significance of such social impacts of effects which
are in varying degree "unquantifiable environmental
amenities and values".
Like other effects which many if not most people consider
harmful social-environmental intrusions, a wide variety of
decisional mechanisms, ranging from private choice to public
regulation, have been employed in making judgments on the
social benefit of noise abatement. However, the framework of
this discussion is tied to the formal, authoritative arenas of
the public decision process and we look primarily to the outcomes
of such arenas as manifesting social impact evaluations and
social significance assessment. For example, was noise intru-
sion ignored or considered de minimis? If recognized, was such
recognition given in the sense that the polluting source was
ordered to cease operations, or to modify its activities in
such manner as to reduce the noise intrusion to a "reasonable
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level" depending upon the circumstances, or to compensate the
injured claimant for harm incurred? A somewhat different set
of questions must be asked with respect to proposed activities
which may produce intolerable or annoying noise levels. For
example, who would benefit by efforts to minimize noise?
How would the cost be apportioned? Or what strategies (alterna-
tive means or combinations of means) are to be employed for
noise abatement? In sum, what noise reduction objective can
be achieved during what period of time through the use of
what means with what distribution of benefits and costs to
whom?
B. Specific Environmental Noise Abatement Contexts
The following decisional contexts are examples of actual
environmental noise abatement situations with which the public
decision process is or must be concerned. They should be
considered, for present purposes, primarily with respect to
the alternatives available to the decisional entity, the means
by which the noise effects related to each alternative are to
be measured, the techniques by which the social impacts of such
noise effects are to be evaluated, and the techniques by which
the social significance of the social impact of the noise
effects (social detriment of the noise or social benefit of
noise abatement) is to be assessed within the context of all
the interacting effects (and their social impacts) involved
in the decision. Consider:
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1. Judicial Arena;
. A motorist has been charged with violation of a state
statute (Mufflers: Prevention of Noise) which prohibits
"excessive or unusual noise," a typical "subjective"
standard. The defendant contends that a subsequent
state statute relating to vehicle noise which esta-
blished "quantitative maximum permissible decibel
levels necessarily superceded the subjective pres-
cription since it was a "conscious attempt of the
Legislature to supply the missing objective stan-
dard of the precise quantity of noise prohibited."
Assuming that no explicit statutory guide is avail-
able and that the legislative history is ambiguous,
what alternatives would seem to be available to the
court and what might be the considerations in prefer-
ring one to the others?
. A local school board brings a suit for damages against
the State Highway Department for interference with the
conduct of classes in a highschool by traffic noise from
a recently completed interstate highway segment. The
noise level has increased from 60 dB to 80 dB, interference
with normal speech commencing at the 65-70 dB level. The
Highway Department has paid the School Board a "fair
market" price for that part of the school property
actually "taken" for the highway. Now, assuming that
the court were disposed to consider the noise intrusion
as a compensable harm (many courts do not, considering
noise as a necessary side-effect of a progressive in-
dustrial society and therefore to be shared by all
without complaint), how might the court determine the
level of damages or otherwise devise a satisfactory
remedy to avoid or compensate for the harm to the
educational process and possibly to individuals? What
are some possibilities? Abate the noise at the source
by relocating the highway - or the school? Reduce
drastically the speed limit on the highway? Require the
Highway Department to erect a two mile buffer on the
right-of-way to reduce the noise effects? Compensate
the School Board in the amount necessary for sealing the
school building and installing air conditioning? Compen-
sate the School Board for the harm inflicted directly on
the "educational process" and individual plaintiffs, if
any, for physical and psychological harm incurred by
reason of the noise? Apart from the consideration that
some of these alternatives are beyond the jurisdiction of
the court to enforce, which of these techniques of abate-
.. .ment at the source, reduction of noise effects, and com-
pensation for harm done are feasible in the sense of being
operationally measurable? Unless the court considers the
noise intrusion de minimis or perhaps too speculative to
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be assigned a level of damages, it must fashion some
remedy. If the court should undertake to compensate
for the interference with the educational process and
harm to individuals, how far in the future would this be
projected? More importantly, how could this evaluation
be made for any specific period of time? How might
the social value orientations of the various parties
affected bear upon the choice of an alternative remedy -
or the amount of damages? How might the concepts of
social justice entertained by the presiding judge enter
into the selection of a suitable alternative? What
effect might notions of social justice as recognized
in somewhat similar past cases in the same judicial
system have on the selection of an alternative remedy?
2. Regulatory Arena;
. §611, a 1968 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom), requires
the Administrator of FAA, in the process of setting air-
craft noise standards, to take into account whether any
proposed standard would be "consistent with the highest
degree of safety in air commerce or air transportation in
the public interest" and to "consider whether any pro-
posed standard. . . is economically reasonable, techno-
logically practicable, and appropriate for the particular
type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance or certifi
cate to which it will apply." Here the social objective
of reducing aircraft noise is clearly circumscribed by
considerations of safety, cost, and technological feasi-
bility. Unless the decision on a given program of noise
reduction (as for example, engine nacelle retrofit propo-
sals) is to be left to a naked adversarial process, how
does the FAA proceed to decide on the new standards?
Does it take "absolutes" such as no impairment in current
safety standards, or no cost in excess of $1 billion,
or what is technologically practicable in five years and
then see what can be done, if anything, for noise re-
duction? Or does it set a minimum noise reduction goal
to be achieved within five years without special regard
to safety, cost, and present forecasts as to technologi-
cal feasibility? Or does it attempt to determine
"reasonable" parameters with respect to safety, cost, and
technology and see what this permits for noise reduction?
Whatever the process of decision, some evaluation of the
social significance of noise reduction is clearly made.
How can the available "demonstrable data" assist in re-
ducing the area of uncertainty as to safety, cost, and
technological practicability and provide a reasonably
accurate range of options as noise reduction goals?
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3. Metropolitan Administrative Arena;
. If a local governmental entity wishes to undertake a
deliberate program of noise reduction around an existing
airport, how does it proceed to design an optimum or
suitable strategy? Modification alternatives might
include?
. Change in aircraft operations as with the use of
preferential runways - or shifting preferential
runways
. Traffic reallocation among airports if more than
one in the metropolitan area
. Airport redesign as with runway length and direction
. Insulation of structures on adjacent land
. Encouragement of compatible land use through econo-
mic, legal, and political incentives
. Selective relocation of schools and other noise-
sensitive community activities
. Compensation for noise intrusion on public activi-
ties and for harmful effects on individuals
It is readily apparent from the HUD Metropoli-
tan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Study (MANAPS)
that literally dozens of alternative strategies might be
posited on the basis of the above noted types of modifi-
cations and combinations thereof. These will involve
different economic costs, different levels of noise
reduction, different degrees of disruption and incon-
venience, different time frames for implementation, and
varying degrees of legal, institutional, and social
obstruction. It is necessary to ask: Just what social
benefit is to be placed on noise reduction in the parti-
cular noise .abatement context? What procedure might be
applied in order to design an optimum or acceptable
strategy? Will not the choice of strategy be in large
part determined by the social significance attributed to
the noise intrusion, or conversely, to noise reduction?
What "demonstrable data" is available for establishing
the limiting economic, legal, political, technological,
and public health parameters within which adjustment can
be made as to what degree of noise abatement is compatible
with the resulting social impacts of other effects of
this action? To what extent can such parameters be
established by "demonstrable data" which would satisfy a
general community consensus? To what extent are the
effects calculable and to what extent must mechanisms
for registration of social preferences be employed?
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Congressional-Legislative/Administrative Arena;
One of the most challenging noise social impact evalua-
tion tasks has been considered in the Congressional .
legislative arena (with eventual attention by the
Environment Protection Agency, Office of Noise Abatement
and Control with respect to implementing regulations and
standards) in connection with the establishment of pro-
posed Federal noise standards in areas other than air-
craft, noise abatement. Since most environmental noise
regulation has traditionally been at the local level
through means of specific ordinances or truncated codes
and by limited areas of State regulation, Federal noise
standards could definitely have serious preemptive impli-
cations for State and local noise regulation. How can
the EPA/ONAC, pursuant to a Congressional mandate to
establish Federal standards, develop a plausible rationale
for setting standards for a variety of mechanisms, pro-
ducts, and devices at prescribed decibel levels (and to
be applied in prescribed manner) so as to satisfy the
disinterested observer that considerations of the need
for uniform national regulation in certain areas is
appropriately balanced against the need for flexibility
of regulation to accommodate a wide diversity of local
conditions? Here the EPA/ONAC must be concerned with
a vast multiplicity of noise sources and noise effects;
with Federal, State and local legislative, regulatory,
and judicial entities which will initiate and enforce
Federal or complementary state and local regulations for
hundreds of particularized noise situations; with a
potentially vast number of diverse decisional contexts
involving any of numerous Federal, State, and local
regulations, multiple decisional arenas with different
alternative courses of action available, varying patterns
of participants with different social justice perspectives,
and with each issue or problem or proposed action arising
under different sets of contextual conditions including
the mix of interacting social interests. Will not the
EPA/ONAC standards necessarily encompass a variety of
alternative approaches to making social impact evaluations
of noise effect, further involving different combinations
of "demonstrable data" and adversarial system? How might
a provision in the Federal law prohibiting States from
setting more stringent noise emission standards from new
vehicles than those prescribed by EPA/ONAC regulations
affect the alternative strategies available to ONAC re
setting Federal standards? How might a provision in the
Federal law leaving control over the use, operation, and
movement of vehicles and other devices to states and muni-
cipalities affect the alternatives available to ONAC?
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIFIC DECISIONAL CONTEXT APPROACH
FOR THE ANTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
The decisional context approach to anticipatory project
assessment has certain implications for the assessment func-
tion. The decisional context analysis has implications for
the assessor whether the situation is one of assessing a
proposed project or projects presented to the assessor or of
a sponsoring entity attempting to determine the "reasonable
expectations" for a useful assessment outcome among several
proposals when only a limited number can be assessed. The
primary implication of the decisional context approach is
that the assessing entity must carefully consider the specific
assessment situation it plans to undertake with special
attention to the diversity of decisional contexts which will
be encompassed in the assessment. This factor is of parti-
cular importance to assessment efforts of proposed actions
which must take into account the continuing assessment,
prescription, and application efforts of multiple decisional
entities in the various decisional arenas with respect to the
implementation of the proposed action. This assessment situa-
tion is graphically illustrated by the action to establish
Federal noise standards for a variety of mechanisms, pro-
ducts, and devices which will be operated in a wide spectrum
of diverse and unique noise environments.
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Implications for anticipatory project assessment flow
from a consideration of every element of the decisional
context:
. The nature of the issue, or problem posed or action
proposed
. The character of the participants: perspectives,
claims, and resources
. The decisional entity within a given decisional
arena: authority and constraints
. The alternatives available to the particular deci-
sional entity to provide relief, set standards,
sanction general authorization to decide or set
standards, or to otherwise dispose of the issue or
problem
. The alignment by the decisional entity of the claims
of participants with the available alternative
courses of action
. The alignment of available courses of action with the
means of identifying effects of the decision outcome
and the measurement of the probability and magnitude
of such effects
. The social impact evaluation of the effects identified
including means of determining and applying relative
degrees of social desirability or undesirability to
the social interests associated with each identified
effect
. The social significance assessment of any or all inter-
acting effects and their social impact so as to arrive
at an operational (though approximate) social cost/
benefit outcome
These various component elements and tasks are obviously
interrelated. The nature of the issue and the authority of
the deciding entity will directly affect the available alter-
natives. The claims of the participants will influence the
selection of the alternative dispositions of the issue or
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action which will be examined. The perspectives of the
participants, including their social value orientation
(asserted concepts of social justice), may have considerable
influence on the degree of social desirability or undesira-
bility attached to social interests related to the effects
flowing from the decision. The claims of the participants
will assist in identifying effects and in providing means of
giving some measurable magnitude to such effects. From these
data, which will be the resultant of some mix of "demonstrable
data" and "adversarial system," social impact evaluations can
be made and social significance assessments can be derived from
a comparative evaluation of the social impacts.
Some of the more elementary though critical implications
of the specific decisional context approach for the antici-
patory assessment function are the following:
.1. The greater the number of diverse problem contexts
encompassed in a proposed action or project, the less
adequate the assessment is likely to be for reason that
the probability and magnitude of any given effect will
differ with the context, the social desirability or
undesirability of the effect may differ, and hence the
social impact of the effect among contexts will dif-
fer. Further, the relative social significance of
the social impact will differ among contexts since
a different mix of effects (reinforcing or competing)
and their associated social interests will be
involved in the various contexts. Hence, assess-
ing the extent to which a given uniform, standard
action will produce an optimum social impact
for the aggregate of problem contexts will tend
to increase in uncertainty as the diversity of
problem and decisional contexts increases. How-
ever, the ^nature j3f the proposed action may also
B—-a - f actfolT Tri the "sense that "if the ef fort is
merely marginal, then the action might be ignored
- 41 -
as of minimal effect, or if sufficiently drastic,
it might in fact eliminate the "problem" in sub-
stantially all of the contexts. The most diffi-
cult assessment task would seem to arise where the
contemplated action will be substantial to the
alleviation of the problem but not a definitive
solution.
2. A corollary to point # 1 is that the greater the
uniformity of elements in the decisional contexts
encompassed in the scope of the defined assessment
task as to:
. The decisional arena
. The affected participants and their claims,
social value perspectives, and resources
. The issue, problem, or action presented
. The necessary, probable or possible effects
of the decisional outcome
. The social impacts of such effects
the more likely that the assessment outcome will be
adequate.
3. Since assessment situations will frequently not be
characterized by the uniformity of decisional contexts
noted in point #2, the closer an assessment and the
follow-on planning function can be linked to identi-
fiable ''predominant effects environments" (major
recurring effects having both beneficial and detri-
mental social impacts with respect to actions or
projects such as highways, airports, buildings,
power plants, etc.) the more likely that the assess-
ment outcome will prove useful in the public decision
process.
4. Closely aligned to point #3 is the implication that
when dealing v/ith an assessment situation which
involves highly diverse problem/decisional contexts,
the management of the assessment task will require
that attention be concentrated on the most pronounced
effects (detrimental and beneficial), on actions or
projects to promote the most beneficial effects,
and on actions or project configurations which will
minimize or eliminate the most offensive adverse
effects. An optional approach is to aggregate ra-
ther than fragment effects for the purpose of
assessment.
5. One criterion of the adequacy of the assessment/planning
function which evolves from the specific decisional
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approach is the degree to which the number, magnitude,
and intensity of potential problem contexts (conflicts,
issues, enforcement and management tasks, etc.) is
reduced or minimized. This suggestion raises another
dimension of questions which must be considered by
an assessment entity undertaking the evaluation of a
project or an action which will impinge upon a number
of diverse problem/decisional contexts. For example,
the reduction of certain problem areas as by an action
to eliminate the primary cause of the problem will
normally involve greater costs than a more modest
effort to moderate the sources of stress and conflict*
Hence, the question will be posed as to whether
it is preferable to eliminate the potential conflicts
in the initiation or design stage or to accept
potential conflicts and their accompanying costs
through time. Depending upon the social problem
area involved, it may be less expensive to compensate
for harm resulting from a project operation over
time than to avoid the adverse effects by initial
project design.
6. One clear implication of the specific decisional
context approach is that the assessing entity
(especially an inclusive-oriented entity which is
undertaking to assess the full scope of social
consequences for all affected participants and
social value-institutional processes) is that the
assessment must be directed to the operational
alternatives-available to the decisional
entity which is expected to utilize the assessment
outcome. Social impacts of effects (or social
cost/benefit evaluations) of alternatives which
are not available to the relevant decisional entity
or entities have little significance for the
public decision process. Put otherwise, assess-
ments must be sensitive to the informational and
analytical needs of the institutional structure
which will consider the assessment outcome.
7. It is also evident that the specific decisional
context approach with its implications for the
relevance of available/operational alternatives
must be sensitive to the fullest range of analytical
and implementation techniques. If the assessment
task involves diverse and complex problem/decisional
contexts, then strategies of multiple means applied
through time may be far more relevant action or
project configuration "alternatives to" be considered
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than a single means (such as uniform standards or
a specific project). In brief, the action or
project should be viewed as an implementing process
rather than a static prescription.
A further implication of point #7 is that program
and project configurations designed for introduction
into diverse problem contexts will often be stra-
tegies involving multiple means applied through
time in some coordinated fashion and further involv-
ing complex process-institutional decisional struc-
tures. This basic strategic alternative will in
fact include a variety of secondary alternatives,
all directed toward a prescribed social objective.
Techniques of inquiry and means of measuring the
probability and magnitude of the primary effect
sought as well as accompanying effects may differ
widely with each of these sub-alternatives. Certain
ones will be susceptible to measurement by empirical
data, analysis, and computational techniques within
varying limits. Others may be determined primarily
by adversarial processes involving clashing expert
witnesses and even bare assertions where there is
a scarcity of hard data. Even in instances where
"demonstrable data" can be applied to approximate
the actual probability and magnitude of effects,
affected participants will differ on the degree
of social desirability or undesirability of a given
effect. Both the measure of effects and the level
of social desirability accorded such effects (pro-
viding social impact evaluation) will tend to differ
with the institutional structures, including deci-
sional processes, which are applied in social impact
evaluation. In other words, the various sub-
alternatives of the basic strategy may be assessed
in different decisional contexts and therefore
produce different social impact evaluations (for
reason of diverse social value orientations) even
if the probability and magnitude of a given effect
is the same in each context. In any event, the lack
of "demonstrable data" to fully satisfy a consensus
of affected participants or the decisional entity
with respect to the measurement of effects, let alone
to settle the level of social desirability of such
effects, will inevitably result in application of
variations of adversarial system to both the assess-
ments and decisions made with respect to each sub-
alternative. In view of the fact/value elements of
all such public decision situations and the usual
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lack of sufficient "demonstrable data" to even
fully develop the factual component (measurement of
effects), resort to adversarial'technique can be a
most useful means of making such determination,
even if the resultant is not eventually proven
to be entirely "scientifically" correct. In
complex assessments, therefore, the adoption of
strategy program configurations in place of single
actions or projects can provide a continuing feed-
back through time, making use of both new "demon-
strable data" and the iterative outcomes of
adversarial system so as to maintain continuing
monitoring and evaluation. In such situations it
will probably be advisable to combine rational
decisional approaches as represented by an initial
total social impact assessment of alternative
program strategies with the incremental approach
as represented by follow-on assessments of the
affected decisional entities and graduated program
implementation through time. The anticipatory
assessment is the selection of strategy, a strategy
implemented and continuously assessed through time.
9. One further implication of the specific decisional
context approach is that we can expect a steady
proliferation of assessment methodologies which are
tailored to the particular problem and action/
project areas of individual agencies, offices, and
commissions at the Federal, State, and local
levels. Indeed, this process is already well
along. While continuous efforts will be made to
bring some useful degree of commonality to assess-
ment procedures, the vastness and diversity of
assessment situations and decisional contexts will
inevitably generate a corresponding differentiation
in approach.
10. Finally, implicit if not fully explicit in the
foregoing noted implications of the Specific Decision
Context approach is the proposition that there is no
single "true" or "right" social cost/benefit assess-
ment of a given project configuration but essentially
unlimited possibilities for social cost/benefit
assessment outcomes. These differing outcomes will
vary with such factors as the effects identified, the
probabilities assigned to such effects, the techniques
employed for the measurement of their magnitude, and
the concept or standard of social justice (social
value weights and distribution) utilized to calculate
the social impacts of the various effects. Put other-
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wise, there are infinite possibilities for
calculating a social cost/benefit assessment
outcome for a given project configuration even
though in practice the number may be reduced to
a relatively few alternatives which would
receive serious attention in the public decision
process.
These various implications tend to emphasize the complexity
of the anticipatory project assessment function. The purpose,
however, has not been to suggest that some project assessments
are simply too difficult to undertake. There is really no
alternative but to perform such assessments if we wish to
maintain some degree of control over the direction and rate of
social change. The complications of the_public decision
process are stressed as a continuing reminder that it is
a complex world and that assessment entities should be
fully aware of this complexity even though various resource
(technical, process, institutional) constraints preclude a
fully adequate total social impact evaluation in most
instances. In this connection it should be recognized that
the foregoing comments by no means cover the full range of
factors which should be taken into account in a provisional
determination of the "reasonable expectation" of obtaining an
adequate outcome from a given assessment. This is a much
broader topic. Comments in this section deal only with some
of the implications for anticipatory project assessments





Carpenter, Richard A., "National Goals and Environmental Law,"
Technology Review, January, 1972, p. 58.
David, Henry, "Assumptions About Man and Society and Historical
Constructs in Futures Research," Futures, September, 1970,
p. 222.
Etzioni, Amitai; and Remp, Richard, "Technological 'Shortcuts' to
Social Change," Science, Jan. 7, 1972, p. 31.
Mayo, Louis H. The Contextual Approach tq^ Technology Assessment;
Implications for "One-Factor-Fix" Solutions to Complex Social
Problems. Mon. 9 (The George Washington University: Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, April, 1971).
Part II
Coates, Vary T.. Technology and Public Policy; The Process of
Technology Assessment in the Federal Government (The George
Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in Science
and Technology, July, 1972).
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 240 F. Supp. 222
(1972) .
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
728 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (1972).
Leopold, Luna; Clarke, Frank E.; Hanshaw, Bruce B.; and Balsley, James.
A Procedure for Evaluating Environmental Impact Circular 645
(U.S. Dept. of the Interior/Geological Survey, 1971).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852, January 1, 1970. (41 U.S.C §4332.)
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Guide for Submission of Information on
Costs and Benefits of Environmentally Related Alternative Designs




Auerbach, Carl A., "Pluralism an<3 the Administrative Process," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March,
1972, p. 1.
Callahan, Daniel, "Ethics and Population Limitation, " Science, February 4,
1972, p. 487.
"Can Science and Ethics Meet?" Washington Post, October 13, 1971, p. A18,
col. 3.
"Ethics Debate Set Off by Life Science Gains," New York Times, March 28,
1971, p. 1. col. 2.
Frankel, Mark. The Public Health Service Guidelines Governing Research
Involving Human Subjects; An Analysis of the Policy-Making Process.
Mon. 10 (The George Washington University: Program of Policy
Studies in Science and Technology, February, 1972).
Freeman, Elaine, "The 'God1 Committee," New York Times Magazine, May 21,
1972, p. 85.
GarIan, Edwin. Legal Realism and Justice. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1941). (Reprinted in Cohen & Cohen, Readings
in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1951).
Grayson, "Costs, Benefits, Effectiveness: Challenge to Educational
Technology," Science, March 17, 1972, p. 1216.
National Academy of Engineering, "Report oh Electromagnetic-Spectrum
Management," News Report (NAS), October, 1970.
Niskanen," William A., "Why New Methods of Budgetary Choices? Adminis-
trative Aspects," Pub. Adm. Rev., March/April, 1972, p. 155.
'.
Problem-of Access to Scarce Artificial Kidney Machines. New York Times,
March 28, 1971, p. 1, col. 2, and New York Times, Oct. 24, 1971,
p. 1, col. 3.
Richardson, Elliott L., "Choice: A Cruel Necessity," Washington Post,
Feb. 13, 1972, p. Bl, col. 1.
Randal, Judith, "Righteous Indignation Misplaced," Washington Evening
Star, Feb. 24, 1972, p. A8, col. 3.
Russett, Bruce M., "Licensing: For Cars and Babies," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists,. November, 1970, p. 15.
- 48 -
•r
Spangler, Miller B., "The Role of Research and Development in Water
Resources Planning and Management for Achieving Urban Goals,"
(Report for the U.S. Dept. of the Interior/Office of Water Resources
Research, October, 1971) .
Stewart, Charles T., "The Theory of Welfare Economics and Its Application
to Government Decisions," (Paper presented to the Society of Gov-
ernment Economists, Arlington, Virginia, February 18, 1972).
U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology.
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Cumulative Regulatory Effects
on the Cost of Automotive Transportation (RECAT) (March 20, 1972).
PART IV
Demos, James T., "Measure of Damages—Wrongful Death," 60 111. B. J.
518 (1972).
In Re Complaint of Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (1971).
Korn, Harold L., "Law, Fact and Science in the Courts," 66 Col. L. Rev.
1080 (1966).
Note, "The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment," 55 Cornell L.
Rev. 860 (1970).
Prosser. Law of Torts (1964).
Sierra Club v. Morton. 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power &'Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956)
PART V
Bronxville Palmer, Ltd, v. Stafce, 318 N.Y.' Supp.; 2d 57 (1971).
City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F 2d 948 (1972).
Coase, R.H., "The Problem of Social Cost," J. Law & Econ., October, 1970,
p. 1.
Dennison v. State, 239 N.E. 2d 708 (1968).
Fleetwood Synagogue, Inc., v. State, 302 N.Y. Supp. 2d 898 (1969).
- 49 -
Laws and Regulatory Schemes for Noise Abatement. (Report to the Office
of Noise Abatement and Control, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency by the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology,
The George Washington University, December 31, 1971).
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F. 2d 667 (9th Cir.
1972).
Mayo, Louis H. Scientific Method, Adversarial System, and Technology
Assessment. Mon. 5 (The George Washington University: Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, November, 1970).
New York Times. October 3, 1971, p. 66, col. 1. (N.J. Highway/School
"noise case.).
Quade, E.S., "On the Limitations of Quantitative Analysis," Rand Corp-
oration, December, 1970.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870 (1970).
Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 333 F. Supp. 338 (1971).
U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development. Noise Exposure"Policies.
Departmental^Circular 1390.2, August 4, 1971.





1. Report No. GWPS-OP 14 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
5. Report Date
November 1972
4. Title and Subtitle SOCIAL IMPACT EVALUATION: Some Implications of
the Specific Decisional Context Approach for Anticipatory Pro-
ject Assessment with special reference to Available Alternativ fe Performing Organization Code
and to Techniques of Evaluating the Social Impacts of the
7. Author(s)
LOUIS H. MAYO
Anticipated Effects of such Alternatives, 8. Performing Organization Kept.No.
Performing Organization Name and Address
Program of Policy Studies in Science & Technology
The George Washington University
Washington, D. C. 20006
10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
11. Contract/Grant No.
NASA NGL 09-010-030
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D. C.
13. Type of Report & Period
Covered
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstracts The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the implications of the
Specific Decision Context approach to Anticipatory Project Assessment. More specificall
it is hypothesized that with respect to any given effect of a proposed project or action
(mobility, job opportunities, air pollution, population distribution, etc.) such effect
will likely differ in probability and/or magnitude from one decisional context to anothe
that the social desirability or undesirability of a given effect is a function (will
differ with) each specific decisional context; that therefore the social impact of such
effect will in all likelihood differ with each specific decisional context; and that the
social significance of even the same social impact of a given effect will vary from one
decisional context to another—when such social impact interacts with (competes with or
reinforces)the social impacts of other effects. It also follows from this analysis that
the respective roles of scientific method (demonstrable data) and adversarial system
will not only differ with each specific decisional context but with each alternative
course of action available to the decisional entity in each specific context. One fur-
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17o. Descriptors ther significant implication is that a single
"true" or "right" social cost/benefit assessment
of a given project configuration does not exist;
rather there are unlimited assessment outcome
possibilities which will vary with such factors
as the effects identified, the probabilities of
and measured magnitudes of such effects, and the
concept or standard of social justice (social
value weights and distribution) utilized to cal-
culate the social impacts of the various effects.
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms
17c. COSATI Field/Group
18. Distribution Statement Releasable tO public Without
limitation. Initial distribution from Program of
POlicy Studies; all subsequent copies from NTIS.
FORM CFSTI-35 (4-70)
19. Security Class (This
Report)
UNCLASSIFIED
20. Security Class (This
Page
UNCLASSIFIED
21. No. of Pages
56
22. Price
$3.00
USCOMM-DC 8BOOZ-P70
